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I. Introduction
"It is hard to say what forms the organised crime
will take in the future, but the reality is not very far
from some science fiction movies. ,,2
The twentieth century marked the era when organized
crime,3 typically equated with the Mafia or La Cosa Nostra,
became a widely recognized and widely studied phenomenon.
Organized crime in the La Cosa Nostra sense burst into the
American awareness in the 1950's and 1960's as a result of
Senator Estes Kefauver's inquiries,a the McClellan Committee
hearings,5 and the Congressional testimony of Joe Valachi, who
was the first Mafia soldier to breach the mob's code of silence.6
1 NCR Distinguished Professor of Law & Technology, University of Dayton
School of Law. Web site: http://www.cybercrimes.net.
2 Bojan Dobovsek, Organised Crime - Can We Unify the Definition? in
POLICING IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: COMPARING FIRSTHAND
KNOWLEDGE WITH EXPERIENCE FROM THE WEST (1996), National Criminal
Justice Reference Service, available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/policing/org323.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
3 This article uses the term "organized crime" to denote collaborative criminal
activity carried out by three or more persons all of whom share a relationship
structured according to certain principles. For more on this concept, see infra §
II.
4 See, e.g., ESTES KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA (1951); U.S. Senate, May 3,
1950: Kefauver Crime Committee Launched, at
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/KefauverCrimeCommitte
e_Launched.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology). See also Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and
the Federalization of Crime, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 213, 236-41 (1984).
5 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 4, at 241-42; Brian Goodwin, Note, Civil Versus
Criminal RICO and the "Eradication" of La Cosa Nostra, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON
Organized crime in the form of street gangs and the Black
Hand existed in the United States for over a century before
Kefauver began his crusade against the mob in the early 1950's.
7
Despite his efforts, though, organized crime remained outside
mainstream American consciousness. The 1920's saw much press
and cinematic attention given to organizations such as Al Capone's
operation in Chicago, but these bootlegger gangs were generally
perceived as a specialized phenomenon, a product of Prohibition.8
Since Americans were, to say the least, ambivalent about
Prohibition, these gangs were neither regarded as a particularly
ominous phenomenon nor considered a threat to the average
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 279, 290-291 (2002). See also Organized Crime
and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 88th
Cong. 80 (1963) (statement of Joseph Valachi) [hereinafter Hearings].
6 "Until Joseph Valachi went public in 1963 ... no Cosa Nostra member had
ever been willing to testify about Cosa Nostra." James B. Jacobs & Lauryn P.
Gouldin, Cosa Nostra: The Final Chapter?, 25 CRIME & JUST. 129, 131 (1999).
See Hearings, supra note 5. See also, e.g., MICHAEL D. LYMAN & GARY W.
POTTER, ORGANIZED CRIME 30-31 (2d ed. 2000); PETER MAAS, THE VALACHI
PAPERS (1968).
7 See, e.g., IRVING SPERGEL, YOUTH GANGS: PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES, ch.
III (1991), National Criminal Justice Reference Service, at
http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/d00027.txt (on file with North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology); HERBERT ASBURY, THE GANGS OF NEW YORK: AN
INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE UNDERWORLD 21-36, 252-62 (1990) [hereinafter
GANGS OF NEW YORK]; HERBERT ASBURY, GEM OF THE PRAIRIE: AN
INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE CHICAGO UNDERWORLD 222-31 (1986) [hereinafter
GEM OF THE PRAIRIE]. See also Thomas L. Jones, Carlos Marcello: Big Daddy
in the Big Easy: Coming to America, The Crime Library, at
http://www.crimelibrary.com/gangsters/Marcello/2.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2002) (Italian immigrants, who began coming to the United States in the 1860's,
brought the "Black Hand", or the Mafia, with them) (on file with North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology). In 1890, the New Orleans police estimated that
the Sicilian Mafia had committed over one hundred murders in the city between
1870 and 1890. See id. See also Federal Bureau of Investigation, La Cosa
Nostra/lItalian Organized Crime/Labor Racketeering Unit, at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/Icn/lcn.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) [hereinafter FBI].
8 Jefferson M. Fish, Conference: Is Our Drug Policy Effective? Are There
Alternatives?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 252-53 (2000).
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American citizen.9 Much the same was true of the slightly-
organized bank robbery gangs, such as the Dillinger gang, Bonnie
and Clyde's group, and others that emerged in the 1930's. While
these gangs represented a type of organized criminal activity, they
were small-scale operations engaging in an activity with which
many Americans sympathized in an era of bank foreclosures.' 0
By the 1960's, however, the combined efforts of Senator
Kefauver, the McClellan Committee, and Attorney General Robert
Kennedy raised American awareness of organized Mafia-type
crime and generated the perception that it was a phenomenon
which threatened the American way of life.11 National concern
9 See Sidney J. Spaeth, The Twenty-First Amendment and State Control Over
Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L REV. 161
(1991) (discussing the ineffectiveness of national regulation in view of
significant variations among local attitudes towards consumption of alcohol).
See also Jendi B. Reiter, Citizens or Sinners? - The Economic and Political
Inequity of "Sin Taxes" on Tobacco and Alcohol Products, 29 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBs. 443, 444 n. 4 (1996) (noting that it was a frequent Prohibition-era
argument that bootleggers' activities should be taxed, not criminalized).
10 Sympathy for these criminals was much augmented by romantic portrayals in
the national media. See CLAIRE BOND POTTER, WAR ON CRIME: BANDITS, G-
MEN, AND THE POLITICS OF MASS CULTURE (1998) (chronicling J. Edgar
Hoover's promotion of a dramatic "G-Man" image during the 1930s).
n The image of organized crime that emerged during this era was calculated to
cause concern among the American public of the 1950's and 1960's. For one
thing, the Mafia was styled, often in lurid terms, as a group composed of
"foreigners" (or recent immigrants, who were perceived in much the same
fashion) who did not share American values. See KEFAUVER, supra note 4, at
19-24. The mob was not, like the bank robbery gangs of the 1930s, made up of
good, Midwestern people who had been treated badly by the banks and were
simply seeking a measure ofjustice. In the still-very-parochial America of the
mid-twentieth century, the foreignness of the mob made it that much more
threatening. See generally id.
Another factor contributing to national concern with organized crime
during this era was the fact that Mafia activities were not activities with which
average American citizens could empathize. The image that emerges from this
era is of an organized group of "foreign" hoodlums who preyed upon good
American citizens for purely commercial reasons. Unlike the perception of the
bootleg gangs of the 1920s and the bank robbery gangs of the 1930s, these
gangs were perceived as having no purpose except victimization for the purpose
of making money. See, e.g., id. at 12-18. And their victims were good, decent
Americans, not the Prohibition authorities of the 1920's or the exploitative
banks of the 1930's.
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about organized crime resulted in Federal law enforcement making
it a priority for the next thirty years. 12 The Federal Bureau of
Investigation, in particular, concentrated on tracking the activities
of various mob families and pursuing their leaders, such as Sam
Giancana and John Gotti.13 Federal prosecutors successfully
pursued large-scale prosecutions against high-profile Mafia
organizations by the 1980's.14 The mob still existed but as a
known threat under control. 15
In the 1990's, law enforcement officials and others who
tracked organized criminal activity identified new types of
organized crime emerging in the United States. 16 Some of these
12 See, e.g., FBI, supra note 7. The concern with organized crime also resulted
in the definition of new, more complex crimes. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner,
RICO, CCE and Other Complex Crimes: The Transformation ofAmerican
Criminal Law?, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 239 (1993).
13 See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, About Organized Crime, at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/aboutocs.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
14 Lesley Suzanne Bonney, The Prosecution of Sophisticated Urban Street
Gangs: A Proper Application of RICO, 42 CATH. U.L. REv. 579, 587-99
(1993). See also SHANA ALEXANDER, THE PIZZA CONNECTION: LAWYERS,
MONEY, DRUGS, MAFIA (1988).
15 James B. Jacobs and Lauryn P. Gouldin, Cosa Nostra: The Final Chapter?,
25 CRIME & JUST. 129, 176-80 (1999).
16 See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S83 10-01 (daily ed. June 20, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Specter introducing "bill to implement a Federal crime control and law
enforcement program to stem gang violence"); 137 CONG. REC. 2740-42 (Jan.
31, 1991) (statement of Sen. Deconcini introducing "a bill to enhance the
Federal Government's authority and ability to eliminate violent crime committed
by outlaw street and motorcycle gangs"); Douglas Frantz, Chasing a New Type
of Mob, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1991, at A1; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
ORGANIZED CRIME, THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY, 33-128 (1986)
(stating that groups active in the 1980's United States included Mafia, oriental
tongs and triads, outlaw motorcycle gangs, Columbian cartels, Japanese Yakuza,
Jamaican Posses, and Russian, Irish, Cuban, Vietnamese, and Canadian gangs).
See also International Crime: Address Before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Appropriations Subcommittee on National Operations (April 21, 1998)
(statement of Louis J. Freeh), Federation of American Scientists, at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1998_hr/s98042 1 -1f.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEM, THE ELECTRONIC INTRUSION THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND




new groups were foreign imports, such as the Japanese Yakuza,
Chinese triads, Jamaican posses, and, at the end of the decade,
Russian gangs composed of expatriate members of the Mafiya. 17
Other groups were domestic. The Hell's Angels motorcycle club,
for example, became a highly-organized, widespread criminal
organization. 18 These new and mostly foreign groups resembled
the Mafia insofar as they had complex organizational structures
emphasizing a hierarchical division of labor, but they were more
flexible and less parochial than the Mafia, which still retained
much of its Black Hand ethos. 19 They also deviated from the
http://www.ncs.gov/ncs/Reports/electronicintrusionthreat2000_final2.pdf (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The same
phenomenon was occurring in other countries, as well, but this article is
concerned only with the evolution of criminal organization in the United States.
See, e.g., JAMES 0. F1NCKENAUER AND YURI A. VORONIN, THE THREAT OF
RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME (June 2001), available at National Criminal Justice
Reference Service, at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/187085.pdf (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
17 See, e.g., Sara Jankiewicz, Glasnost and the Growth of Global Organized
Crime, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 215 (1995); Goodwin, supra note 5, at 279, 283;
Jacobs and Gouldin, supra note 15, at 139. See also JEFFREY ROBINSON, THE
MERGER: THE CONGLOMERATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 83-
103, 169-93, 298-315 (2000).
18 See Goodwin, supra note 5, at 283. See also Stephen S. Trott, Words of
Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381
(1996) (analyzing failed federal prosecution of gang members on conspiracy and
racketeering charges).
19 See, e.g., Edgardo Rotman, The Globalization of Criminal Violence, 10
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 18 (2000). The "Black Hand" ethos refers to the
Italian Mafia's strong emphasis on ethnic and family ties. See, e.g., Ralph
Salerno, The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy and Organized Crime
14-16, at Kennedy Assassination Home Page, at
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/russ/jfkinfo/jfk9/hscv9a.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). It also
denotes the principles upon which it is based. For centuries, Mafia initiates have
taken an oath in which they swear to the following: a code of silence (omerta);
total obedience to the capo or boss; an obligation to assist any allied Mafia
member or group; a commitment to avenge an attack on members of one's
Mafia family; and a commitment to have nothing to do with legitimate
authorities. See, e.g., History of the Mafia, at The Alleged Mafia Site, at
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/russ/jfkinfo/jfk9/hscv9a.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). These
principles date back many centuries, to the Mafia's origins in native Sicilian
FALL 20021
Mafia in another important way: they tended to be overtly and
self-consciously transnational in their membership and activities.
20
While the Mafia occasionally engaged in transnational activities,
these activities tended to be limited, reflecting the Mafia's primary
emphasis on local endeavors, such as drug dealing, loan-sharking,
illegal gambling, and prostitution.
2 1
The emergence of these transnational criminal
organizations in the late twentieth century generated concern
analogous to that produced by American society's "discovery" of
the mob in the 1960's.22 Nations, law enforcement, and others
who tracked organized criminal activity began concentrating on
transnational organized crime as a new and even more dangerous
phenomenon than the emergence of the Mafia.23 This focus
continues today. Since the globalization of crime is a trend that
resistance to invading forces. See, e.g., id.
The name "Black Hand" comes from a practice Sicilian organized
crime developed in the 1700s: Gang members sent "Black Hand" notes to
wealthy citizens asking for money in return for protection. See, e.g., id. If the
victims did not comply, they and their families would almost certainly be
targeted for violence. See id. In the nineteenth century, Italian immigrants
brought this practice to the United States. See, e.g., Thomas L. Jones, Carlos
Marcello: Big Daddy in the Big Easy: Coming to America, at
http://www.crimelibrary.com/gangsters/marcello/2.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
20 See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 17, at 102 (noting that "there are fifty-four
countries around the world that have an active Russian organized crime
presence"). See also Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Transnational
Criminal Activity (Nov. 1998), Federation of American Scientists, at
http://fas.org/irp/threat/backlOe.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology); International Crime Threat Assessment, Federation of
American Scientists, at http://fas.org/irp/threat/pub45270chapl.html (Dec.
2000) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
21 See generally Jacobs & Gouldin, supra note 15, at 139-55. The Mafia's
transnational efforts almost exclusively consisted of activities undertaken to
facilitate its local endeavors. As such, the mob developed international
connections to allow the importation of drugs and the laundering of the proceeds
of its unlawful activities.
22 This phenomenon evoked similar concern in other countries but, again, this
article is concerned only with the United States experience.
23 One of the concerns about emerging organized transnational crime groups is
the degree to which they are willing to collaborate with each other. See, e.g.,
ROBINSON, supra note 17, at 298-315.
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will only accelerate, this concentration on transnational organized
crime will persist.
The issue to be considered in this article is whether what is
true of traditional crime is likely to also be true of cybercrime,
which deviates from the traditional model of crime in several
ways. Section II of this article examines reasons why organized
activity has emerged as an aspect of real-world crime. More
precisely, it considers the advantages organization offers for real-
world criminals. Section III then considers whether these
advantages translate to cybercrime. If they do translate, we can
expect to see the emergence of organized cybercriminal activity
analogous to that encountered in the real world; that is, we can
anticipate the emergence of cybercrime Mafias and cybercrime
cartels. To the extent that these advantages do not translate to
cybercrime, we may see a very different pattern emerge;
organization may prove to be a less significant feature of
cybercrime than of real-world crime or it may take quite different
forms than those found in real-world crime.
II. Criminal Organization: The Real World
This article is concerned with criminal organization. For
purposes of this article, a criminal organization is an organization
that devotes the majority of its efforts to committing crimes for the
primary purpose of generating wealth.24 Any criminal
24 See, e.g., Gwen McClure, The Role of Interpol in Fighting Organized Crime,
481 INT'L CRIM. POLICE REVIEW (2000), Interpol, at
http://www.interpol.int/Public/Publications/ICPR/ICPR48 1_1.asp (Interpol
defines organized crime as "any association or group of people taking part in
continuing illegal activity for profit, regardless of national boundaries") (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The discussion that
follows in the next two sections will often tend to equate "generating wealth"
with theft, robbery, or extortion; that is, they emphasize a dynamic in which the
criminal elicits wealth from a victim by overcoming the victim's resistance. In
other words, the victim parts with his or her wealth unwillingly. Criminals can,
of course, also "generate wealth" by tricking a victim into parting with money or
other things of value; this is larceny by trick or fraud. The discussion in the text
tends to emphasize the unwilling victim scenario when it is discussing the first
type of criminal organization, the "gang" structure, because this structure
evolved to facilitate theft, robbery and extortion.
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organization, so defined, also commits crimes for other purposes,
such as security. To ensure its survival, a criminal organization
may bribe officials, murder rivals and turncoats, and engage in
related activities. These. efforts, however, are subordinate to the
organization's principal goal of making money; a criminal
organization of whatever order of complexity is a business venture.
This essentially commercial focus differentiates a criminal
organization from an individual criminal, as individual crime is
often irrational, emotional crime. The type of group crime
considered for this discussion is rational, goal-oriented crime that
enriches perpetrators at the expense of victims.
25
This commercial focus also differentiates a criminal
organization from its closely-related counterpart, a terrorist
organization. Much of what is stated below regarding the
advantages of organization for criminal groups is also true of
terrorist groups, and the next section considers how the availability
of cyberspace may influence the structure of terrorist
organizations. The analysis concentrates primarily on criminal
organizations, however, because their rational, goal-oriented focus
means they are likely to seize upon whatever organizational or
other techniques enhance their pursuit of wealth.26 This capacity
to adopt new organizational or other techniques is less true of
terrorist organizations because, while they can operate in a
rational, goal-oriented manner, their concern with ideological
principles often causes them to make irrational decisions when
pursuing their goals.27
25 Individual crime can also be rational and directed toward enriching the
perpetrator at the victim's expense. The distinction which is important for the
analysis in this section is that while individual crime can be rational, goal-
oriented crime, it can also be emotional and irrational; group crime, on the other
hand, is intrinsically rational and goal-directed. It is also significant for this
discussion that, as is explained later in the text, individual crime cannot, by
definition, be organized crime; organized crime requires the existence of a
group. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
26 See, e.g., THE ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZED CRIME (G. Fiorentini & S. Peltzman
eds. 1995); PrNo ARLACCHI, MAFIA BUSINESS: THE MAFIA ETHIC AND THE
SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Martin Ryle trans. 1986).
27 The decision-making processes of some terrorist organizations can be
genuinely irrational - motivated by anger, pain, or frustration without regard to
method or consequence; however, some apparently irrational decisions may
[VOL. 4
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Criminal organizations, like their civilian counterparts, are
assemblages of individuals whose relationships are structured
according to certain principles. Since staff is a defining
characteristic of any organization, it is necessary to-begin a
consideration of criminal organizations by parsing out staffing
modalities employed in the commission of crime.
A. Staffing of Criminal Organizations
Logically, there are three modalities for criminal activity:
solo commission, collaboration by two people, and activity
conducted by three or more people. Only the third alternative
represents organized criminal activity. Since organization requires
a structured relationship between persons, action by a single
individual cannot involve organization. One could argue that since
it is possible to have a structured relationship between two
people,28 such collaboration should qualify as organization. This
merely reflect goals, methods, rewards; and punishments defined through a very
different set of values. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Symposium Legal
Responses to International Terrorism: International Legal Responses to
Terrorism, 22 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 3, 10-11 (1999).
28 The relationship would necessarily have a simple structure. Logically, the
two could operate as equals or one could assume responsibility for directing
their joint activities and the other could follow this individual's direction. As
sociologist Georg Simel explained, the structure of human interactions becomes
much more complex as one moves from a dyad (two people) into a triad (three
or more people). See, e.g., LEWIS COSER, MASTERS OF SOCIOLOGICAL
THOUGHT 186 (2d ed. 1977):
Simmel's emphasis on the structural determinants of social
action is perhaps best exemplified in his seminal essay,
"Quantitative Aspects of the Group.". . . examines forms of
group process and structural arrangement insofar as these
derive from sheer quantitative relationships.
A dyadic relationship differs qualitatively from all other types
of groups in that each of the two participants is confronted by
only one another and not by a collectivity. Because this type
of group depends only on two participants, the withdrawal of
one would destroy the whole ....
When a dyad is formed into a triad, the apparently insignificant
fact that one member has been added actually brings about a
FALL 20021
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argument, however, ignores the reasons why organized criminal
activity is perceived as a distinct threat. The law has long
recognized the increased dangers that result when criminals
associate, as evidenced by the historic tradition of imposing
liability for conspiracy and complicity. Two criminals can cause
more harm than one, but the level of harm they can cause is
necessarily limited. A criminal collaboration between two people
is just that; it cannot expand into new, different, and more
dangerous forms. 29 Criminal organizations' ability to expand, both
in terms of personnel and the level of harm inflicted, is one of their
distinctive aspects 30 and is the reason why twentieth century law
enforcement devised new strategies to deal with organized or
enterprise criminality. 31 Another distinctive aspect of criminal
major qualitative change. In the triad, as in all associations
involving more than two persons, the individual participant is
confronted with the possibility of being outvoted by a
majority.
The triad is the simplest structure in which the group as a
whole can achieve domination over its component members; it
provides a social framework that allows the constraining of
individual participants for collective purposes. The dyad
relies on immediate reciprocity, but the triad can impose its
will upon one member through the formation of a coalition
between the two others. Thus, the triad exhibits in its simplest
form the sociological drama that informs all social life: the
dialectic of freedom and constraint, of autonomy and
heteronomy.
See also Georg Simmel, Quantitative Aspects of the Group in THE SOCIOLOGY
OF GEORG SIMMEL, 87 (K.H. Wolf ed. 1950).
29 See supra note 28. It is therefore sufficient from the law's perspective to
prohibit and punish such collaborators for (a) the specific, substantive crimes
they commit together and (b) the act of collaborating, which take the form either
of conspiring (agreeing to work together toward criminal ends) or abetting
(providing assistance in the commission of criminal acts).
30 At a very basic level, the dynamics of the relationship between individuals
changes dramatically when it moves from two to three people. See supra note
28. As noted above, there are only two possible structures for a two-person
relationship, i.e., equals or leader and follower. But once a third person is
added, the complexity of the possible relationships increases. See supra note 28.
31 At the federal level, for example, Congress created the RICO and CCE
statutes, both of which are designed as weapons against highly organized
criminal activity. The legislative history of both statutes clearly evinces
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organizations is that, like a corporation, the organization survives
the departure of individual members.32 This is not true of a
criminal collaboration between two people; the desertion of either
destroys the association.33 Consequently, the remainder of this
article will use the term organization to mean a group of at least
three individuals that is structured according to certain principles
and works to achieve criminal ends. 4 Three individuals is, of
course, merely a benchmark; the discussion will assume groups of
much larger size.
Having resolved the staffing issue, an important question
for purposes of this analysis is why those committed to criminal
endeavors find organization attractive. To answer this question, it
is necessary to consider the evolution of criminal organization in
Anglo-American history.35
Congress' recognition, based on its investigation of emerging types of organized
criminal activity, that there is a direct relationship between the complexity of a
criminal organization and the level of harm it can inflict.
32 See supra note 28. See also James Moody & Douglas R. White, Social
Cohesion and Embeddedness: A Hierarchical Conception of Social Groups
(June 22, 2000), (manuscript submitted for publication to American Journal of
Sociology) at
http://www.santafe.edu/files/workshops/dynamics/SCOCONI.pdf (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
33 See Moody & White, supra note 32.
34 This definition is common in statutes that address the activities of organized
criminal groups. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(f) (1997 & Supp. 2002);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(1) (2000 & Supp. 2002); Iowa Code Ann. §
723A.1(2) (1993 & Supp. 2002); 15 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1404(A) (2001 &
Supp. 2002).
35 What follows is, of course, merely a sketch of the history of organized crime
in Anglo-American history. The analysis is limited to the Anglo-American
tradition because this is the context from which our legal principles emerged,
including those governing the criminalization of collaborative criminal activity.
The purpose here is not to provide a detailed historical account of this
phenomenon, but rather to provide a general empirical framework that can be
used to analyze whether organization will assume the same importance for
cybercrime that it has for real-world crime.
FALL 20021
B. The Evolution of Criminal Organization in Anglo-
American History
Criminal organizations have existed for centuries. 36 In the
thirteenth century, the perhaps-apocryphal Robin Hood presided
over his band of Merry Men, which was clearly a type of criminal
organization. The group was structured according to certain
principles: Robin was" in charge and the others were not; Robin
decided what activities the group would undertake, and his Merry
Men implemented his decisions. This type of criminal
organization, which manifests itself through succeeding centuries
in English and American history, is best characterized as a gang
organization. A gang organization is effectively two-tiered: there
is a leader and there are followers. 37 The leader may have one or
more subordinates to whom he delegates leadership authority in his
absence, but this delegation is limited, and subordinates remain
mere followers. 38 The advantage this simple organizational model
36 More precisely, they have existed for centuries in the Anglo-American
tradition, which is the context examined in the text above. Criminal
organizations of the "gang" type described in the text have existed for millennia
and have manifested themselves in every society; other, more complex
organizational types have also emerged but, again, the concern here is solely
with Anglo-American history. For a brief review of gang history in the United
States, see, e.g., Lou Savelli, Introduction to East Coast Gangs (2000), at
National Alliance of Gang Investigators Associations, at
http://www.nagia.org/east_coast_gangs.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).37 See, e.g., IRVING SPERGEL, YOUTH GANGS: PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES ch.
III (1991), National Criminal Justice Reference Service, available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/d00027.txt (on file with North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology); Tony Lee, The Triad Myth, U.S. Department of State
International Information Programs, at
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/chinaaliens/triadmyth.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). See
generally George W. Knox et al., The Facts About Gang Life in America Today:
A Study of Over 4,000 Gang Members, ch. 7 (1997), National Gang Crime
Research Center, at http://www.ngcrc.com/ngcrc/page9.htm (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
38 This type of two-tiered organization is, of course, not peculiar to criminal
endeavors. It is the oldest, simplest mode of organization, and is therefore found
in every human society; as a tribal structure, it constituted the earliest form of
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offers for miscreants is the directed, combined efforts of many
individuals in carrying out criminal activity. Like Robin and his
Men, the robber gangs that roamed English highways in the
seventeenth century were effective because they had the personnel
needed to intimidate targets into surrendering their valuables; the
size of the gang was especially important given that armed guards
accompanied many travelers. The same was true of robber gangs
in the American West, the pirate gangs of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, 39 and the urban street gangs that operated in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 40 The gang's strength
socio-political organization. See, e.g., DAVID RONFELDT, TRIBES,
INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, NETWORKS: A FRAMEWORK ABOUT SOCIAL
EVOLUTION 5-6 (1996), available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/P/P7967/P7967.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
39 "[U]ntil the seventeenth century, [high-seas piracy] was widely sanctioned in
most countries...." It was not outlawed until the nineteenth century, and persists
today. See, e.g., Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging
Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, 2002 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 3
(2002), at
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/03_020625_goodmanbrenner.php
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology); Ethan A.
Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in
International Society, 44 INT'L ORG. 479-556 (1990), available at
http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/transcrime/articles/GlobalProhibitionRegimes.h
tm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).40 See, e.g., ASBURY, THE GANGS OF NEW YORK, supra note 7; ASBURY, GEM
OF THE PRAIRIE, supra note 7. The same is also true of other robber gangs, such
as the bank robbery gangs that proliferated in Depression-era America. It is also
true of the Sicilian Mafia, the progenitor of the American version, the Yakuza,
the tongs and triads, and all the other pre-twentieth-century criminal
organizations.
This model tends to take on a little more complexity with the urban
street gangs of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Unlike robber
gangs which, as their name implies, were concerned only with perpetrating
armed theft, these gangs tended to garner profits from multiple activities, such as
robbery, pocket-picking, prostitution, and arson. See, ASBURY, THE GANGS OF
NEW YORK, supra. They still maintained the simple structure of the "gang"
model, however, because instead of operating these various activities themselves
they utilized the intimidating effect of their personnel to extort profits from
those who conducted the activities. These groups conform to the "gang" model
articulated above, therefore, because the advantage organization offers is the
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is its size.4' It functions because there is a leader who provides
direction and is obeyed because his legitimacy is established by
certain organizing principles, which can be as simple as the fact
that he can physically intimidate others.
The gang organizational model persisted for centuries and
will, no doubt, always be with us. It is the simplest model. It is, in
effect, a group's starting point on the road to more complex
criminal organization. The American Mafia, for example, which
long ago surpassed this simple organizational structure, began as a
gang organization.
43
The evolution of the American Mafia, as an example, raises
the question: why do criminal organizations evolve beyond the
gang model? Since criminal organizations do not leave records
documenting their strategic decisions, it is necessary to answer the
evolutionary question by reference to the anecdotal information
that has emerged concerning the evolution of the American Mafia,
the historical context in which this shift occurred, and influential
civilian organizational structures of the time.
From its establishment in the nineteenth century until the
1930's, the American Mafia essentially conformed to the gang
model. Indeed, in its earliest Black Hand incarnation, the
ability to call upon the direct, combined efforts of many individuals. See, e.g.,
id.
41 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 37.
42 The legitimating principle can also be tradition, seniority or any of several
other options. In a traditional system, leadership is allocated according to
familial relationships, so that members of certain "families" are always the
gang's leaders; this is simply the reiteration of a pattern than has been endemic
to human history. This pattern still evidences itself in the American Mafia.
Notwithstanding the complex hierarchical organization which has evolved over
the last seventy years, the constituent units of the American Mafia - the local
"families" - still tend to be dominated by individuals from a particular
biological family. See, e.g., PETER MAAS, UNDERBOSS: SAMMY THE BULL
GRAVANO'S STORY OF LIFE IN THE MAFIA 33-36, 107-12 (1997). The identity of
the group that controls a specific "family" can, of course, be changed, usually by
violence, but blood ties continue to play an important part in dictating Mafia
leadership.
43 See, e.g., The Mafia, at http://www.bestofsicily.com/mafia.htm (last visited
Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
See Hearings, supra note 5 (statement of Joseph Valachi).
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American Mafia was little more than a robber "gang that exploited
its ability to command men who were willing to engage in violent
acts to steal and extort money from others.' 4 This defining
characteristic might well have continued to the present date had
Prohibition not occurred.
Prohibition offered those willing to violate the law
opportunities to make enormous profits, but doing so required
engaging in a commercial activity. The profit-making aspect of
Prohibition lay in one's ability to satisfy the American public's
desire to consume liquor illegally.45 To satisfy that desire, it was
necessary to supply liquor, which meant either importing it from
abroad or manufacturing it domestically. 46 As the potential profit
in Prohibition became apparent, gangs across the country moved to
take advantage of the opportunity offered and, in so doing, shifted
from simply preying on others to becoming criminal
entrepreneurs.47 Exploiting the public's desire to drink required
44 See, e.g., ASBURY, GEM OF THE PRAIRIE, supra note 7. See, e.g., Salerno,
supra note 19, at 17.
45 See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 213, 226 (1984).
46 See, e.g., Henry W. Anderson, Separate Report of Henry W. Anderson, in
REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES (Jan. 7, 1931), Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, at
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/Library/studies/wick/anderson.htm (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); William S. Kenyon,
Separate Report of William S. Kenyon, in REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 7, 1931), Schaffer Library of
Drug Policy, at
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/Library/studies/wick/kenyon.htm (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). See also DAVID
KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 20-35 (2d ed. 2000) (1979),
available at Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, at
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/history/rnp/RNP2.html (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
47 See, e.g., Mark Gribben, The Purple Gang: Bootlegger's Paradise (2000), at
http://www.crimelibrary.com/gangsters/purple/purplemain.htm (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). See also Nora V. Demleitner,
Organized Crime and Prohibition: What Difference Does Legalization Make?,
15 WHITTIER L. REV. 613, 622-23 (1994):
Prohibition changed the structure of organized crime and
America's attitude towards it. Loosely organized groups
turned into well- organized and structured enterprises. During
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developing and sustaining an organization that could either bring
liquor into the country in a reliable manner or manufacture it
domestically and then distribute it to outlets in territory the gang
48
controlled . Importing liquor required the development of
complex organizational structures, but manufacturing it required
much more in terms of organizational evolution. While
importation continued throughout the era of Prohibition, domestic
manufacturing dominated the market because it was cheaper and
more reliable. 9
The successful bootleg gangs, such as the Capone operation
in Chicago and the Olmstead operation in Seattle, 50 therefore
evolved from robbers who merely stole from others into complex
criminal organizations with hierarchical divisions of labor
analogous to those found in civilian corporations.5' While bootleg
Prohibition most gangs were organized along kinship ties and
ethnic lines with the most prominent being Italian, Irish, and
Jewish.48 See, e.g., ALBERT ROSENBERG & CINDY ARMSTRONG, THE AMERICAN
GLADIATORS: TAFT VERSUS REMUS, 8-20 (1995). It also required developing
security systems which were designed to ensure that neither the liquor nor the
patrons who purchased it from the gangs fell into the hands of law enforcement
officers who were dedicated to enforcing the Prohibition laws. See id. See also
infra note 51. This adds another layer to the evolving division of labor
described above. See infra note 51.
49 Aside from transportation costs and the risks of losing shipments in transit,
importing liquor was a more expensive proposition because the liquor that was
imported was of better quality. Some of the liquor manufactured in the United
States was of good quality, but much of it was distinctly inferior to the imported
alternatives and to the liquor that had legitimately been produced in the United
States before Prohibition. See, e.g., William S. Kenyon, Separate Report of
William S. Kenyon, in REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 7, 1931), Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, at
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/Library/studies/wick/kenyon.htm (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Not having much in
the way of alternatives, American citizens drank what the gangs provided. See
id.
50 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842, (9th Cir. 1927), aff'd 277
U.S. 438 (1928).
51 See, e.g., Frank J. Loesch, Separate Report of Frank J. Loesch, in REPORT ON
THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 7,
1931), Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, at
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/Library/studies/wick/loesch.htm (on file
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gangs were not as organizationally sophisticated as the Mafia
would become, they represented a change in criminal
organization.52 Simple organization is advantageous because of
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology):
A strong reason... why I favor immediate steps being taken
to revise the [Eighteenth] Amendment is in order to destroy
the power of the murderous, criminal organizations flourishing
all over the country upon the enormous profits made in
bootleg liquor traffic. Those profits are the main source of the
corruption funds which cement the alliance between crime and
politics and corrupt the law enforcing agencies in every
populous city.
Those criminal octopus organizations have now grown so
audacious owing to their long immunity from prosecutions for
their crimes that they seek to make bargains with law
enforcing officers and even with judges of our courts to be
allowed for a price to continue their criminal activities
unmolested by the law.
Those organizations of murderers and arch criminals can only
be destroyed when their bootleg liquor profits are taken from
them. So long as the Eighteenth Amendment remains in its
present rigid form the nation, the states, the municipalities, the
individual citizen, are helpless to get out of reach of their
poisonous breaths and slimy tentacles.
If not soon crushed those criminal organizations may become
as they are now seeking to become supergovernments and so
beyond the reach of the ordinary processes of the law.
See also Kenyon, supra note 49. Indeed, Charles "Lucky" Luciano modeled the
Mafia Commission and the hierarchical structures it controlled on modem
corporate structure. See, e.g., FBI, supra note 7 (noting that Luciano ran the
Mafia "like a major corporation"). See also JEFFREY ROBINSON, THE MERGER:
THE CONGLOMERATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 31 (2000).
52 See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 213, 226 (1984):
While America had organized crime before prohibition, it was
more diverse, loosely structured, and primarily involved with
prostitution, gambling and political corruption on a local level.
These activities did not require large organizations. In
contrast, prohibition created a need for large-scale distribution
networks comprising smugglers, distillers, bottlers,
warehouses and trucks as well as numerous retailing
outlets.... [T]his required far more organization than did
operating a house of prostitution or a bookie joint, and
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the manpower, the sheer physical force the group commands; the
utility of this force lies in the fact that it can be used to appropriate
wealth generated by others. More complex organization is
advantageous because it enables criminal groups to carry out more
complex activities that generate wealth independently of the
activities of others; the group becomes an entrepreneurial
enterprise possessing the capacity to control its revenues. The
more effectively a group conducts its criminal enterprises, the
more wealth it generates; increased profitability is the primary
utility of increased organizational complexity.
During the Prohibition era, the Mafia and other gangs
followed this path by concentrating on improving the efficiency
with which they conducted their illegal enterprises in order to
maximize profits.53 One finds the same level of evolving
organizational complexity in all the historically successful bootleg
gangs, including identifiably ethnic Italian, Irish, and Jewish gangs
as well as more generic operations like the Olmstead and
organized crime, as we know it today, was born ....
See also Salerno, supra note 19, at 17.
Bootlegging became an enormous industry. It was a
fascinating complex, involving domestic manufacture
(running the gamut from home stills and bathtub gin to
sophisticated full-size clandestine breweries); a complicated,
illicit distribution system; and large-scale rumrunning--
champagne and brandies from France, Scotch from the British
Isles, whisky from Canada, and native brews from the
Caribbean. Such an industry required large numbers of people
willing to break the law, a stable and specialized labor force, a
tightly disciplined organization, and strong leadership. It was
logical for established groups of organized criminals to step.
[sic] in to meet the need, and foremost among these were the
Italian criminal societies. They expanded to the extent that
they entered into associations with people of other ethnic
backgrounds, but the core unit was still Italian.... The Italian
groups, however, came to dominate the bootleg industry,
amassing tremendous wealth and gaining invaluable
experience in business that was put to good use after
Prohibition ended.
53 See supra note 52.
[VOL. 4
Cincinnati operations. 54 Their paths diverged, however, when
Prohibition ended. Many of these gangs seem to have been
products of Prohibition, and when it ended, so did they.
55
The Mafia, however, was different. It had existed long
before Prohibition and was determined to continue operating when
it ended.56 Having tasted greater profits generated by
entrepreneurial criminal activity, mob bosses had no desire to go
back to the older, robber-gang operational model. This forced
those who led various Mafia groups to figure out how to sustain
their entrepreneurial model of criminal activity when the original
reason for its existence ceased to exist. With liquor sales legalized
at the federal level, 57 Mafia bosses realized that while they could
continue in the liquor business, the level of profitability would be
far below Prohibition era levels because it was now a
commercially competitive environment.
54 See supra note 47. See, e.g., Richard C. Lindberg, The Mafia In America:
Traditional Organized Crime in Transition (2001), at http://www.search-
intemational.com/Articles/crime/mafiaamerica.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Ralph Salerno, Testimony Before the
House Select Committee on Assassinations (September 28, 1978), at
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/russ/jflcinfo2/jfk5/saler.htm. See also Henry W.
Anderson, Separate Report of Henry W Anderson, in REPORT ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 7,
1931), Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, at
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/Library/studies/wick/anderson.htm (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Kenyon, supra note 49.
See also DAVID KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 20-35 (2d ed. 2000)
(1979), available at Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, at
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/history/rnp/RNP2.html (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
55 See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 47 (noting that "only the most successful"
bootleg gangs survived the repeal of Prohibition). See also John J. Binder, The
Chicago Outfit, at http://www.americanmafia.com/Cities/Chicago.html (2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
56 See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 47, at 626-27.
57 Prohibition laws were still in place in some states, so the Mafia could continue
to supply bootleg liquor in those areas. This alternative, however, simply did
not offer the profits that were available during national Prohibition; local
Prohibition laws tended to be enacted in more rural states, not in the
cosmopolitan areas - New York, Chicago, San Francisco - where there was a
greater demand for liquor.
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The Mafia's inability to rely on bootlegging activities upon
which it had relied for essentially a decade resulted in the
evolution of the modem Mafia. During the 1930's, the American
Mafia began the process of developing a highly complex
58
organizational structure. 8 The process culminated in the
recognition of a number of Mafia families, each assigned a
territory, 59 and the creation of the National Commission, which
presided over the families.6 ° One advantage of this global
hierarchical structure is that it offers a means of resolving familial
disputes without bloodshed.6' While this alternative has not
always proven successful, it, along with the allocation of territory
58 See, e.g., Jacobs & Gouldin, supra note 6; Sara Jankiewicz, Glasnost and the
Growth of Global Organized Crime, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 215 (1995); Salerno,
supra note 54. See also Lindberg, supra note 54:
The... Mafia is... structured much like a modem
corporation in the sense that duties and responsibilities are
disseminated downward through a 'chain of command' that is
organized in pyramid fashion....
1. Capo Crimini/Capo de tutti capi (super boss/boss of
bosses)
2. Consigliere (trusted advisor or family counselor)
3. Capo Bastone (Underboss, second in command)
4. Contabile (financial advisor)
5. Caporegime or Capodecina (lieutenant, typically heads a
faction of ten or more soldiers comprising a 'crew.')
6. Sgarrista (a foot soldier who carries out the day to day
business of the family. A 'made' member of the Mafia)
7. Piciotto (lower-ranking soldiers; enforcers ..... )
8. Giovane D'Honore (Mafia associate, typically a non-
Sicilian or non-Italian member).
See also James 0. Finckenauer, La Cosa Nostra in the United States,
National Institute of Justice, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/intemational/lcn.html (last visited Nov. 6,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
59 See, e.g., Lindberg, supra note 54. See generally 26 Family Cities,
AmericanMafia.com, at http://www.americanmafia.com/26_FamilyCities.html
(last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology). See also KEFAUVER, supra note 4, at 13-14.
60 See, e.g., FBI, supra note 7 (noting that Luciano ran the Mafia "like a major
corporation"). See also Lindberg, supra note 54 ("Patterned after the
hierarchical structure of modem corporations, the Commission was a tightly
controlled bureaucracy of crime based on patriarchy").
61 See, e.g., Salerno, supra note 19, at 23-24 (noting prior level of violence).
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among the families, has in recent decades essentially eliminated
the internecine wars that used to plague Mafia operations in this
62
country. The families built upon their global organizational
structure by evolving individual structures that let them carry out
entrepreneurial and other activities.63 For each family,
development of individual structures results in the creation of
criminal divisions that carry out specific entrepreneurial activities,
such as drug-dealing, prostitution, loan-sharking, and illegal
gambling, as well as security.64 FBI monitoring of Mafia families
over the years has confirmed that each has evolved a complex,
hierarchical organizational structure analogous to that found in
civilian corporations.
Although, to a lesser degree, the same is true of other
domestic, late twentieth-century criminal organizations, such as the
62 See, e.g., Salerno, supra note 19, at 26. See also Lindberg, supra note 54;
Salerno, supra note 54. See generally Testimony of Angelo Lonardo Before the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on
Government Affairs (April 4, 1988), at
http://americanmafia.com/lonardotestimony.html (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
63 See 26 Family Cities, supra note 59.
64 See, e.g., Testimony of Josephy D. Pistone Before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government
Affairs (1988), at http://americanmafia.com/pistonetestimony.html (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). "Security" involves (a)
ensuring the physical safety of Mafia family members as they carry out their
various activities and (b) attempting to ensure that these activities do not come
to the attention of police and prosecutors. See, e.g., Dave Haskell, Jury Convicts
ex-FBI Agent of Corruption, WASH. TIMES (May 28, 2002), at
http://www.washtimes.coml/upi-breaking/28052002-052937-4868r.htm (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); James Ridgway de
Szigethy, In the Money: Congressman James Traficant and His Campaign
Contributors (Feb. 2001), at
http://www.americanmafia.com/Feature_Articles_121.html (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
The entrepreneurial efforts can be a mix of old and new. That is, they
can combine truly entrepreneurial activities such as prostitution, loan-sharking,
drug-dealing, and illegal gambling with-more traditional forms of banditry such
as theft and extortion. See, e.g., Pistone, supra. The latter are merely lucrative
survivals from the Mafia's prior incarnation as a pure "robber" gang; they no
longer dictate the organizational structure of its constituent entities, the five
families. See generally id.
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El Rukn gang, the Crips and Bloods, the Latin Kings, and the
Hell's Angels. 65 It is also true of many foreign criminal
organizations, such as the Colombian drug cartels,66 the Yakuza,67
the Chinese tongs and triads organizations, 68 and the Russian
Mafiya.69 In the latter part of the 1990's, another phenomenon
65 See, e.g., George W. Knox, Gang Profile Update: The Black P. Stone Nation
(BPSN), National Gang Crime Research Center, at
http://www.ngcrc.com/bpsn2002.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2002); David
Starbuck, James C. Howell & Donna J. Lindquist, Hybrid and Other Modern
Gangs, U.S. Department of Justice Juvenile Justice Bulletin, at
http://www.iir.com/nygc/acgp/bulletins/hybrid and other modemgangs.pdf
(Dec. 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology);
George W. Knox, Gang Profile: The Latin Kings, National Gang Crime
Research Center, at http://www.ngcrc.com/ngcrc/page 15.htm (last visited Nov.
6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Steve
Tretheway, Motorcycle Gangs or Motorcycle Mafia?, National Alliance of Gang
Investigators Associations, at http://www.nagia.org/Motorcycle Gangs.htm
(1998) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). But see
Dave Starbuck, Breaking All the Rules: Hybrid Gangs (2000), National
Alliance of Gang Investigators Associations, at
http://www.nagia.org/HybridGangs.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).66 See, e.g., The Columbian Cartels, PBS Frontline, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/business/inside/colombia
n.html (2000) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
67 The Yakuza has two different organizational structures: "freelance Yakuza,"
which uses the traditional gang structure, and "clan-yakuza," which has a
hierarchical structure similar to that of the Mafia. See, e.g., The Yakuza
Structure, Oldmind, at http://w1.313.telia.com/-u31302275/yakuza6.htm (last
visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology). See also History of the Yakuza-Feudal Japan, at
http://www.clanyakuza.com/modules.php?name=Historia (2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); The Yakuza, Okinawan
Shorin-Ryu Matsubayashi-Ryu Karate-Do, at http://www.okinawan-
shorinryu.com/okinawa/yakuza.html (last modified Apr. 7, 2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
68 See, e.g., James 0. Finckenauer, Chinese Transnational Organized Crime:
The Fuk Ching, National Institute of Justice, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/international/chinese.html (2000) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). See also Lee, supra note 37.
69 See, e.g., State of California Office of the Attorney General, Russian
Organized Crime: Organization and Structure, Federation of American
Scientists, at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para!docs/rusorg3.htm (Mar. 1996)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); James 0.
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emerged: these groups began cooperating among themselves,
thereby affecting an incremental division of labor, which, in turn,
increases efficiency in generating revenue. 70 The global drug
trade, for example, is characterized by increasing cooperation
among organized crime groups from various parts of the world.71
These cooperative efforts represent a lateral organizational layer
superimposed upon the groups' own hierarchical structures.
The evolved organizational structure of these late twentieth
and early twenty-first-century criminal groups is the product of a
shift in focus. So long as a criminal group contents itself with
preying upon others, it can maintain a simple organizational
structure. The two-tiered gang structure described earlier, for
Finckenauer, Russian Organized Crime in the United States, National Institute
of Justice, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/international/russian.html (1999) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Caspar Fithin,
Russian Mafiya (Nov. 9, 2000), Oxford Analytica, at
http://www.oxan.com/columns/wkcol_09112000.html (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). See also James 0. Finckenauer & Elin
Waring, Challenging the Russian Mafia Mystique (Apr. 2001), National Institute
of Justice Journal, at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles 1/jr000247b.pdf (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).7 0 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT ch. 1, at
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/pub45270/pub45270cha
p1 .html#4 (Dec. 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology):
Much more than in the past, criminal organizations are networking and
cooperating with one another, enabling them to merge expertise and to
broaden the scope of their activities. Rather than treat each other as
rivals, many criminal organizations are sharing information, services,
resources, and market access according to the principle of comparative
advantage. By doing so, they can reduce their risks and costs and are
better able to exploit illicit criminal opportunities.
Id.
71 See, e.g., Bernard Castelli, The Globalization of the Drug Trade, at
http://www.unesco.org/most/sourdren.pdf (Apr. 1999) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Testimony of Louise Shelley, Director,
Center for Transnational Organized Crime and Corruption, Before the House
Committee on International Relations (October 1, 1997), at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1997_hr/h97 1001 ls.htrn (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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example, suffices for this purpose. Once a criminal group moves
into entrepreneurial, revenue-generating activities, however, this
simple structure no longer suffices for precisely the same reasons a
simple organizational structure proves inadequate when conducting
legitimate, revenue-generating activities. Preying on others is a
simple, interactive process, since overcoming victim resistance is
the only necessity to gaining those victims' possessions.
Entrepreneurial activity, on the other hand, depending upon its
complexity, requires a fairly complex division of labor to produce
wealth. 73 At least, this is true of real-world crime. The next
section considers whether it will likely hold true for cybercrime.
III. Criminal Organization: The Virtual World
"Will we see the emergence of cybercrime
cartels? ,74
This article is concerned with the emergence of new types
of organized criminal activity specific to cyberspace, not with the
migration of real-world organized crime to cyberspace.75 To date,
almost nothing has been written about whether organized criminal
activity will emerge in cyberspace and, if so, what forms it may
take. This lack of speculation can be attributed to cybercrime's
relative novelty; the perception that cybercrime is perpetrated by
hackers, who are loners, and are therefore not inclined to engage in
group criminality; and the fact that, to date, most documented
cybercrime reveals that a majority of incidents involve individuals,
72 This is not to say that some organizational complexity cannot emerge in a
"robber" criminal group which is dedicated to preying on others.
73 The same is true of terrorist organizations that are dedicated to pursuing
complex goals, such as the carrying out of large-scale attacks on the populace of
nations with whose values and goals they disagree. Al-Qaeda, for example, has
a highly evolved organizational structure, or at least it did prior to the war in
Afghanistan.
74 Question posed at Interpol's Fourth Cybercrime Conference (Lyon, France,
December 6, 2000).
7' The latter is being written about. See, e.g., Phil Williams, Organized Crime
and Cyber-Crime: Synergies, Trends and Responses (August 2001), Global
Issues, at http://usinfo.state.gov/joumals/itgic/0801/ijge/gjO7.htm (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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not groups. 76 Although there are a few reported instances of
organized cybercrime, 77 there is generally no indication that
cybercriminals have attained the gang level of organization.78
The current absence of organized cybercriminality makes a
consideration whether organization will likely become an aspect of
crime on the virtual frontier particularly topical and appropriate.
Logically, the first issue to consider when analyzing forms
criminal organization may take in cyberspace is the extent to which
already-evolved forms of criminal organization are likely to
migrate to the virtual frontier. Since the already-evolved forms of
criminal organization have proven successful in the real world, it is
reasonable to expect that they will enjoy at least a measure of
success in the cyberworld. The section immediately below
undertakes this analysis. It is possible, however, that empirical
differences between the real world and the cyberworld will prevent
the effective transfer of existing forms of real-world criminal
organization modalities into cyberspace. If such is the case, one
must speculate about alternative forms of criminal organization
that may emerge in cyberspace. These issues are considered in
section III (B).
76 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 75 ("In the virtual world, as in the real world,
most criminal activities are initiated by individuals or small groups and can best
be understood as 'disorganized crime"').
77 See, e.g., RICHARD POWER, TANGLED WEB 102-113 (2000) (describing the
Phonemasters case).
78 See supra § II. There are reports of cyber-gangs - notably, Russian hacker
gangs - operating in cyberspace. See, e.g., Russia Arrests "Grandfather of
Cybercrime," BBC News, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1353092.stm (May 26, 2001) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Alex Salkever, A World
Wide Web of Organized Crime (March 13, 2001), Business Week, at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/mar200l/nf20010313_967.htm
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). These gangs,
however, are very small, informal groups that have not developed the type of
formal structure necessary to qualify as a gang under the model developed
earlier; they are more accurately characterized as hacker groups. See, e.g.,
China's Hackers and Blockers, China IT & Telecom Report (September 6,
2002).
A. Migration of Hierarchical Models
As section II explains, real-world criminal organization has
so far assumed one of two hierarchical forms: the two-tiered gang
structure or the complex, layered structure epitomized by
American Mafia families. 79 Section II also explained that a
group's structure is determined by the nature of its activities: a
robber group that concentrates on appropriating wealth from
others, for example, operates quite satisfactorily with the two-
tiered gang structure and has no need for complex levels of
organizational structure. Once a group turns to entrepreneurial
activities and generates its own wealth by conducting multiple
criminal endeavors, however, it requires a more complex structure,
characterized by a sophisticated division of labor.
1. The Two-Tiered Gang Structure
The simpler organizational structure was the first to emerge
for real-world criminality and required less personnel and
resources to manifest itself. Will the twenty-first century witness
the emergence of cyber-gangs that prey upon legitimate citizens of
cyberspace, appropriating wealth through terror and intimidation?
As section II explained, gangs emerged in the real world because
they offered a more effective way of making profits by taking
wealth from others. Real-world gang effectiveness lies in the
directed efforts of several individuals to overcome victim
resistance. In effect, the gang is a force multiplier.8 °
Is a force multiplier needed to prey effectively upon the
citizens of cyberspace? The answer to this question may lie in the
empirical differences between the real world and the cyberworld.
In the real world, especially in the historical real world in which
the traditional gang structure emerged, victims, often aware of
79 See supra § 1I. The differentiating feature of the gang structure, versus the
modem Mafia structure, is that the chain of command in the gang structure tends
to be direct. That is, there are few, if any, intermediaries between the leader and
subordinates. This is distinctly not true of the layered, intensely hierarchical
structures found in modem mob families.
80 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 37.
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their vulnerability, sought to avoid victimization by arming
themselves, building walls, and joining forces with others to resist
banditry. Bandits responded by organizing a force of sufficient
power, the gang, which could overwhelm victim resistance, either
by intimidation or actual physical attack.8 ' As to the latter, bandit
gangs could overcome walls and other defenses and, if strong
enough, could defeat victim and victim supporters' physical
resistance. Force, however, was essential.
Is force essential in the cyberworld? In a sense, it is. If, for
example, a Russian hacker wants to profit by victimizing an
American business, a type of force is needed to overcome the
victim's electronic defenses to either appropriate the victim's funds
or intimidate the victim into paying for abatement of the
harassment. The force needed, however, has nothing to do with
assembling the combined strength and efforts of other hackers.
Rather, the force needed to complete these depredations is a
function of technology, of automation. In the cyberworld, physical
strength is insignificant; a hacker surmounts a victim's defenses,
not by summoning combined efforts of ten or twenty hackers, but
by using technology, automated techniques that enable one to
bypass electronic defenses.8 2 In the cyberworld, strength is in
software, not in numbers of individuals.
8' The use of force is a defining characteristic not only of robbery but of
extortion, as well.
82 Perhaps the best example of this is the distributed denial of service attack. In
February of 2000, a fifteen-year-old Canadian known only as "Mafiaboy" used a
distributed denial of service attack to shut down websites operated by CNN,
eBay and Amazon.com, causing billions of dollars in damage. See, e.g.,
Mafiaboy's Pre-Trial Guilty Plea, Wired News, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,41287,00.html (Jan. 18, 2001) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Hacker Saga
Continues: Mounties Nab 15-Year-Old Canadian, IT World, at
http://www.itworld.com/Sec/3834/ITW384/ (Apr. 19, 2000) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Mafiaboy acted alone, using
innocent computers---"zombies"-to mount the attack; as in any denial of
service attack, he used easily available programs to seize control of the
computers he would use as zombies, often without the knowledge of their
owners. See, e.g., What Is A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack?, Fox
News, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,55382,00.html (June 15, 2002)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Eric J. Bowden,
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The unimportance of numbers of hackers needed to commit
crimes in the cyberworld suggests that the base rationale for
development of the gang structure will play little, if any, role in
83structuring cybercrime. Put differently, since cybercriminals can
do so quite successfully on their own, they need not join forces to
extort money from online victims.
Are there other reasons why cybercriminals might find the
gang structure an attractive device? It is difficult to answer that
question at this point in time. There have been such few
documented instances of complex cybercrime activity that it is
difficult to speculate on what forms it might take in the future.
Logically, the attractiveness of the gang structure lies in its ability
to concentrate the efforts of a number of individuals toward
achieving a single goal. In the real world, these efforts tend to
involve the threat or application of physical force, but there is
reason to ask why they are limited to that. The two-tiered gang
structure is, after all, a device for concentrating and directing the
efforts of a number of individuals. It seems, then, the gang
structure might be attractive when cybercriminals want to combine
efforts to accomplish a task more complex than victimizing a
single person or entity.
The gang structure might be useful if a group of
cybercriminals decides to undertake a series of mostly
simultaneous depredations targeting multiple victims instead of
individually pursuing the sequential exploitation of isolated
DoS vs. DDoS Attacks, ZD Net, at
http://www.zdnet.com/products/stories/reviews/0,4161,2645417-2,00.html (Oct.
30, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). In
2001, a thirteen-year-old Wisconsin boy used a denial of service attack to shut
down a California computer security site. In the real world, adolescents cannot
mount solo attacks that cripple multi-million dollar businesses, but it is not
particularly difficult in the cyberworld. See Steve Gibson, The Strange Tale of
the Denial of Service Attacks Against GRC. COM, Gibson Research Corporation,
at http://iso.grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). We can only speculate as to the
form cyberattacks may take in the future, since it is reasonable to assume that
they will become even more sophisticated in nature and devastating in effect.
83 The gang model may prove attractive to other groups, such as terrorist
organizations, since they may want to mount concerted activity against certain
targets, such as governments or agencies of state infrastructures.
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victims. In other words, the gang structure might be attractive to
cybercriminals who speculate they can more efficiently enrich
themselves by joining together to pursue multiple victims in
synchronized attacks. For the structure to be attractive, however,
there would have to be some circumstance that would differentiate
this scenario from the simple, albeit effective, one-on-one type of
victimization described above.
The rationale for such an effort might be that many
prospective victims would be demoralized by the coincident
attacks on others and, therefore, would surrender more readily to
cybercriminals' demands. A scenario such as this might be
predicated on an extortion scheme whereby cybercriminals destroy
data and other valuables belonging to some victims to extort
protection money from a larger group of victims.84 Hypothesizing
an extortion scheme of this type, in effect, continues the emphasis
on the gang structure as a way to concentrate physical force. The
impetus for the gang's association in this scenario is destruction,
virtual destruction, but, nonetheless, activity of a type common to
real-world gangs. The more interesting question remains whether
scenarios will evolve whereby the concentration of criminal effort
to reach ends other than destruction make the utilization of the
gang structure an attractive proposition for cybercriminals.
Clearly, however, the migration of the gang structure to
cyberspace is to some extent problematic because a gang's
structural advantage in the real world, the concentration of effort,
may be of little importance in the cyberworld. Whether this holds
true of the highly complex, "criminal-organization-as-
entrepreneur" model also warrants consideration.85
84 This scenario suggests that the gang structure may well prove attractive
whenever a group's goal involves the destruction or disruption of items in the
cyberworld. If that is true, then the gang structure should prove attractive to
groups that are animated by other than "criminal," profit-seeking motives; this
would include terrorist and other ideologically-motivated groups.
85 See supra § II.
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2. The Highly-Complex Criminal Organization
As section II explained, this model emerges when criminal
groups move away from generating profits by taking wealth from
others to operating revenue-generating activities. The principal
advantage that highly-complex organization offers is the ability to
synchronize the extensive, complex division of labor needed to
carry out large-scale, diversified, criminal activity. This model is
an adaptation of a hierarchical model that evolved long ago to
structure the opRerations of government and military
organizations. It evolved in response to the difficulties involved
in maintaining control of diverse activities spread over a wide
geographical area.87 In the gang structure, the leader maintains
control by directly monitoring and overseeing gang activities.
Monitoring and oversight are adequate so long as the gang
confines its efforts to a single endeavor, robbery, for example,
conducted in a limited territory. Once the gang moves into
multiple endeavors, especially multiple entrepreneurial endeavors,
however, the gang model no longer suffices. The scope of the
operation makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the leader to be
everywhere and supervise everyone. This difficulty is exacerbated
when the gang's diversified activities are conducted over a large
territory, because greater distance enhances the problem of
maintaining direct, individual supervision.88
The evolved hierarchical model found in the modem Mafia
resolves the problem of exerting control by establishing multiple
86 See, e.g., Vince Juliano, Review: John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, Network
and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy (2001), Connecticut
Libraries, at http://cla.uconn.edu/reviews/netwars.html ("Traditionally,
humankind's most powerful organizations have been hierarchical in structure.
Hierarchy evolved over the centuries to provide large enterprises with efficient
communications and centralized command and control") (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). See also RONFELDT, supra note 38, at
6-8.
87 See, e.g., RONFELDT, supra note 38.
88 The difficulty of maintaining control as the activities of a gang expand, and as
its personnel expands, is the reason why gangs often fracture into discrete
entities, each competing for the same endeavors. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 37.
Gang fracturing, for example, was quite common during Prohibition.
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tiers of leadership roles and delegating a measure of authority to
each tier.89 Organization becomes hierarchical, and supervision
becomes sequential, for example, from Mafia soldier to captain to
capo. 9° As explained in section I, this model originally evolved to
carry out bootlegging activities during Prohibition, which was
American organized crime's first true venture into illicit
entrepreneurial activities. 91 The complex model subsequently
evolved into the organizational structure the modem Mafia uses to
operate a criminal organization that engages in a variety of
entrepreneurial activities.
92
This history raises a question about the likelihood that this
model will migrate into cyberspace. Assuming illicit
entrepreneurship appears in cyberspace, will it require the same
operational structure such entrepreneurship requires in the real
world? Put differently, will it entail a series of differentiated steps
necessary to assemble the substance of the entrepreneurship, the
product or services supplied, and distribute it to customers? To the
extent cybercrime entrepreneurship requires this type of articulated
organizational structure, it is likely to incorporate a version of this
hierarchical organizational mode. To the extent it does not, it is
unlikely to rely upon this organizational model.
It is difficult to project, at this time, what forms cybercrime
entrepreneurship might assume. The only simulacrum of such
activity at the moment consists of illegally distributing copyrighted
material, such as software, music, and videos. 93 Copying and
distributing materials someone else has created is a relatively
simple process; it does not require the differentiated, sequential
89 See supra note 58.
90 Id.
91 Prohibition was not, strictly speaking, crime's first venture into
entrepreneurship. Pre-twentieth-century activities such as prostitution were
entrepreneurial in that they independently generated revenues. None of these
activities, however, involved the differentiated task structure needed to supply
illegal liquor to the American public.
92 See supra notes 59 - 65 and accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes Manual § III(E), U.S.
Department of Justice - Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, at
http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipmanual/03ipma.htm (last updated April 23, 2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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organization of discrete tasks that was needed to provide illegal
liquor during Prohibition and that is needed to provide illegal drugs
during the current era of drug prohibition.
Suppose cybercrime entrepreneurship resulted in the
emergence of a "virtual drug." The attraction of currently
available recreational chemical substances lies in their capacity to
alter one's experience of physical reality in certain ways.
Current experiments with virtual reality already suggest the
emergence of modes of virtual reality experiences that have the
same effect and consequences as recreational drugs. 95 These
virtual reality experiences can alter one's perception of reality and
could conceivably become addictive. 96 Because of the addictive
nature and detrimental consequences stemming from use,
authorities could conceivably outlaw virtual reality experiences,
using rationales similar to those used to outlaw real-world drugs,
such as the fact that they impede normal functioning and could
94 See, e.g., Responsibilities of the Recreational Drug User in D.F. DUNCAN &
R.S. GOLD, DRUGS AND THE WHOLE PERSON, at
http://www.angelfire.com/realm2/duncaniantheory/ResponsibleDrugUse.html
(1982) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
95 See, e.g., Meme, at http://www.immersive.com/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of-Law & Technology); Active Worlds, at
http://www.activeworlds.com/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Ultima Online, at http://www.uo.com/
(last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology). See also guardianbooya, Virtual Addiction, PlanetPapers, at
http://www.planetpapers.com/Assets/4191 .php (2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Cyberhobbit, Mediatheory: A
Postmodern Cosmology of Virtual Reality § 2.7.1, at
http://www.cyberhobbit.de/diss/diss l5.htm (1997) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Sandra E. Calvert, The Social Impact
of Virtual Reality, at
http://vehand.engr.ucf.edu/handbook/Chapters/chapter38.PDF (last visited Nov.
6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). For
an account of how one can become immersed in a virtual world, see JULIAN
DIBBELL, MY TINY LIFE: CRIME AND PASSION IN A VIRTUAL WORLD (1998).
96 See, e.g., WILLIAM SHATNER, TEKWAR (1990) (describing the battle against
cartels which distribute Tek, a highly-addictive virtual-reality "drug;" set in
2120). See also Edward Gross, Designing Tek World, RetroVision, at
http://www.retrovisionrnag.com/tekworld.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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perhaps have a deleterious effect on health, in this case, on users'
mental health.
Imagine that four years in the future -a virtual reality drug
which has become quite popular among a large section of society
is outlawed. As occurred during Prohibition, the illegality of use
should create a profitable, illicit entrepreneurial opportunity. It is
therefore reasonable to assume that cybercriminals would quickly
move to take advantage of this opportunity The critical question
is whether cyber-entrepreneurs would find it advantageous to
employ a modem, Mafia-style hierarchical organizational structure
in carrying out activities. It is logical to assume that their
entrepreneurial venture would have to perform the same functions
as a real-world, illicit, entrepreneurial endeavor, as they would
have to obtain a consistent, reliable supply of the "virtual drug."
Presumably, this would involve manufacturing it, purchasing
quantities of it from a manufacturing source, or, perhaps, stealing
it. Since neither of the last two options seem calculated to provide
a reliably consistent source,97 it is probable they would choose to
manufacture it themselves. These cyber-bootleggers would also
have to have a marketing and distribution network, a way to let
potential customers know they could supply the virtual drug and
some way to deliver it to customers.
In the real world, a hierarchical organization featuring a
complex division of labor is needed to do these things because they
must be done by people, for the most part, and because they
involve the organization and coordination of physical activity in
the real world. Bootleg gangs operating during Prohibition, for
example, had to establish, equip, and maintain breweries and
distilleries. They had to arrange for a reliable supply of the grains
97 Since the drug has been outlawed, purchasing quantities of it is likely to be
difficult, just as, and for the same reasons that, purchasing beverage alcohol
domestically was not a viable option for bootleggers during Prohibition. Once
the virtual drug has been outlawed, manufacturers will either stop making it or
will manufacture it in limited quantities for "authorized" uses, such as
psychiatric treatment. If the virtual drug is no longer manufactured, would-be
virtual drug bootleggers cannot purchase it, nor, for that matter, can they steal it.
If the virtual drug is manufactured in limited quantities and its distribution
carefully monitored, it would not be possible for these would-be virtual
bootleggers to purchase or steal quantities sufficient to meet their needs.
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and other raw materials needed to manufacture liquor. Prohibition-
era bootleg gangs had to recruit, pay and ensure the loyalty of
individuals who possessed the skills needed to manufacture and
bottle the liquor. They established outlets, speakeasies, and places
where bottled liquor could be sold and arranged for the
transportation of liquor to these establishments. They kept track of
inventory, demand, revenues, and, perhaps, at least some level of
quality control. They also had to ensure security for themselves
and their customers. It would have been impossible to accomplish
all these tasks effectively and efficiently with a simple gang
structure. The impossibility of accomplishing all this with a gang
structure is why the complex, hierarchical structure currently found
in modem American mob families emerged once the antecedents
of those families got into bootlegging.
The hypothetical cyber-entrepreneurs who take on the task
of supplying the hypothetical virtual drug to its users must also
perform these functions, but in a very different context. Assume,
for example, the virtual drug would take the form of a software
program. The program contains a set of coded instructions that
would operate a reader, a device that translates the code into a
virtual reality experience or, more accurately, a variety of virtual
reality experiences. To simplify the analysis, we shall assume that
the readers are not outlawed, indeed, are in wide distribution
because they also have legitimate uses. Therefore, the cyber-
entrepreneurs only need to supply the virtual drug itself, that is, the
software. If cyber-entrepreneurs merely clone extant versions of
the software, their production process should be relatively
straightforward, a matter of simply duplicating the virtual drug.
They should be able to automate the process, meaning that, unlike
their Prohibition era counterparts, they would have no need for a
large production facility and production employees. This would
eliminate the need for an entire organizational layer. The cyber-
entrepreneurs would still need to market and distribute the virtual
drug, but it is logical to assume that these processes, as well, could
be accomplished primarily, if not entirely, through automated
techniques. This would eliminate yet another organizational layer.
Automated techniques would replace the large numbers of humans
who would otherwise have to be assigned to perform discrete tasks
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as part of a large organization. It seems, then, that cyber-
entrepreneurs could operate quite effectively without a formal,
hierarchical structure.
98
This conclusion is limited to a scenario in which the cyber-
entrepreneurs content themselves with simply reproducing already-
extant versions of the virtual drug. While this strategy might prove
effective for a while, it is quite probable that users would come to
demand new and, perhaps, more sophisticated versions of the
virtual drug.99 To satisfy this demand, cyber-entrepreneurs would
have to establish some means of creating new versions of their
product, which could then be copied and distributed using the
automated processes described in the scenario above. It might be
possible to automate this process as well by having computer
systems that created new versions of the virtual drug. This
scenario would leave the conclusion above intact, that the use of
automation means there is no need to organize a large number of
people to carry out the fabrication, production, marketing, and
distribution processes. But what if it was not possible to automate
the creative process? What if humans were the only ones who
could perform it? Would that require the incorporation of some
structured, hierarchical organizational modes? It might if the
cyber-entrepreneurs followed the bootlegger's lead and
permanently employed a group of designers and engineers. It
seems more reasonable to assume cyber-entrepreneurs would use
independent contractors with the requisite skills on an as-needed
basis to provide new versions of the virtual drug. This would be
cheaper and would enhance security. By dealing with independent
98 The conclusion would no doubt be different if cyberspace were used to supply
a real-world product such as a new designer drug. Some sort of hierarchical
organizational structure would be required, just as it is required for
contemporary online retailers, like Amazon.com, who wish to distribute tangible
products.
A "virtual drug" of the type hypothesized above would be an amalgam of
recreational chemical substance and computer game. It would couple the
perception-of-reality-altering capacities of the former with the latter's capacity
to evolve into new and more complex forms. Indeed, exploiting the latter
capacity might be essential to keep users of such a drug hooked, since there
would presumably not be the physiological addiction common to recreational
chemical substances.
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contractors, cyber-entrepreneurs could mask their identities and
thereby reduce the risk that the creative people would help law
enforcement find and dismantle their illicit venture.
It seems as though cyber-entrepreneurs purveying illegal
goods and services should be able to operate effectively without
utilizing the type of formal, hierarchical organizational structure
employed by real-world criminalentrepreneurs. Consequently, it
appears that neither of the organizational models that have evolved
to structure real-world criminalactivities is likely to be a necessary
and inevitable component of group criminality in cyberspace.
B. New Models?
Although the discussion has tended to characterize only the
modem Mafia-style organizational model as hierarchical, in fact,
both models of real-world criminal organization are hierarchical.
While the Mafia model is a multi-tiered hierarchical model, the
gang model has only two hierarchical levels, leaders and
followers. 100 The hierarchical nature of these models is not
surprising, as hierarchical organization has been the dominant
model in Western culture since the Middle Ages. 01
Hierarchical organization is the most effective method to
structure human activities, both legitimate and illegitimate, in the
real world. The physical constraints of the real world such as
distance, terrain, climate, and resources, that is, the general fixed,
predetermined nature of reality, mean there are many activities
individuals cannot accomplish alone. These activities require
group effort. Hierarchical organization evolved as an effective
way of organizing group effort for the accomplishment of activities
such as these.10 2 It utilizes a division of labor and a chain of
command to deploy individuals among the series of discrete tasks
needed to accomplish specific activities and to ensure that their
efforts are effectively directed toward that end. In their own ways,
both the Mafia-style complex organizational model and the gang
model are designed to achieve this.
'oo See supra §11(A).
101 See, e.g., RONFELDT, supra note 38.
102 id.
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The Mafia-style model is a true hierarchical model with a
complex division of labor and supervising structure. The gang
model is a simple hierarchical structure in which the leader assigns
tasks which followers perform. The gang model suits the
accomplishment of relatively uncomplicated activities and is ideal
for the accomplishment of the activities discussed in section II, the
appropriation of others' wealth. 10 3 It is, perhaps, accurate to
characterize the gang model as an organizational structure that
evolved to organize human-to-human interactions. 0 4 In this
regard, it is analogous to similar structures that have been used to
carry out war,10 5 which is also an activity directed at other humans.
The Mafia-style model, on the other hand, evolved to deal with
more abstract endeavors, namely, the production of wealth. 10
6
As section II(A) explained, hierarchical organizational
models are products of the real world, as they evolved to structure
human activity in ways that were effective given the constraints of
the physical world. Cyberspace differs from the real world in this
regard. It is not a fixed, predetermined reality operating according
to principles and dynamics that cannot be controlled or altered by
man. The cyberworld is a constructed world, a fabrication.
Because it is a construct, cyberspace is mutable; much of it can be
modified and transformed. 0 7 Even as to cyberspace-as-given, 0 8
the constraints of the real world are, for the most, part irrelevant.
In the real world, it takes a great orchestration of human effort to
103 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 37.
104 See supra notes 36 - 41 and accompanying text.
105 See, e.g., PHILLIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND
THE COURSE OF HISTORY (2002).
106 See, e.g., Salerno, supra note 54. See also Lindberg, supra note 54.
107 It is true that much of what we experience in the real world - streets,
buildings, stores, vehicles, furniture, and electronic devices - is also contrived,
the product of human intelligence and effort. In the real world, these
contrivances necessarily operate within certain externally-dictated constraints;
pool tables, for example, must have legs as well as tops. In the virtual world,
however, these constraints do not hold; pool tables do not require legs in a
"place" where gravity does not exist, and a pool table can be transformed into a
dining table or a buffalo. See, e.g., NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH 50 (1992)
(in the virtual world, known as the Metaverse, tables only have tops, not legs).
108 1 use this term to denote aspects of cyberspace that are effectively fixed, that
cannot be transformed by casual users.
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send a hard copy file halfway around the world. In cyberspace,
one can send an electronic version of the same file halfway around
the world with only a few keystrokes.
This essential absence of physical constraints is one factor
that differentiates the cyberworld from the real world. Another
differentiating factor is the way we experience the two realities.
Physical reality has a fixed empirical structure; this structure itself
is not hierarchical, but we necessarily experience it through the
filter of socially-organized hierarchical structures. If we want to
send a hard copy of a file to someone halfway around the world,
speak to that person on the telephone, or travel to visit, we must
rely upon and participate in hierarchical structures to do so. It
would be impossible for us to do any of these things unilaterally.
The lack of physical constraints in cyberspace, however, means
that our experiences there do not have to be mediated through
hierarchical structures. 1°9 Indeed, the very nature of cyberspace is
109 It is true that we still have to participate somewhat in external hierarchical
structures in order to experience cyberspace. Most of us, for example, obtain an
account from an Internet service provider and use that account as our point of
access to the Internet. One can bypass this step by using cybercafrs and other
publicly available portals, but they, too, still involve a reliance on an external,
no doubt hierarchically organized, service provider. The inevitability of this
circumstance in no way diminishes the validity of the observations made in the
text above for at least two reasons. First, the service provider may not have to
be hierarchically organized. Most probably are, but that may be attributed to the
fact that extant service providers evolved in the context of real-world activity,
for which hierarchical organization is advantageous. As cyberspace matures, we
may see the evolution of lateral access structures or, indeed, the disappearance
of service providers as such; individuals may come to enjoy essentially
unmediated access to cyberspace.
The second reason why the contemporary reliance on a service provider
does not undermine the validity of the observations made above is that this
factor is irrelevant to our experience of cyberspace. Our experience of
cyberspace is distinct and unprecedented because we have, even at this early
stage in its evolution, the sense that we "go into" a different place, that
cyberspace is a world other than the real world to which we are accustomed.
We do not have this experience when, for example, we make a telephone call.
When we make a telephone call, we do not "enter telephone space;" we remain
in the real world, fully aware that we are utilizing a real-world artifact to
communicate with someone who is situated at another physical point in the real
world. When we "enter" cyberspace, on the other hand, we leave real-world
constraints behind, we communicate with people as to whose identities,
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inconsistent with hierarchy. Cyberspace is a network or, more
properly, a network of networks.'10 Networks are lateral, diffuse,
fluid, and evolving. Hierarchies are vertical, concentrated, and
tend to be rigid and fixed.
These characteristics of cyberspace, the absence of fixed,
empirical constraints and a diffuse, fluid, evolving environment,
indicate that hierarchical organizational structures are at once not
needed in and not appropriate for activities conducted in
cyberspace. What, then, will criminal organization look like in
cyberspace? Perhaps it is necessary to begin the analysis with a
more fundamental question: will organized criminal activity in
cyberspace ever actually exist?
Earlier, this article defined organization as relationships
structured according to certain principles. Organizational
structures in the real world tend to be rigid for the reasons given
above. Organizational structures in cyberspace will tend to be
fluid and dynamic, also for the reasons outlined above. But
organization will be needed, as it is already needed, in cyberspace.
To demonstrate why organization will be needed, as well as
the forms it may take, it is useful to consider the current hacker
subculture. The media portray hackers as social isolates,
individuals to whom any type of organized activity, indeed, any
kind of social interaction, is anathema.Il' There have been and are,
no doubt, hackers who tend to be reclusive with regard to real-
world group involvements. What the media overlooks, however, is
citizenship and physical location we may be happily ignorant. Even at this early
stage in the evolution of cyberspace, our experience of it is not hierarchical, is
not self-consciously mediated through hierarchical organizations.
110 See, e.g., Kevin Hughes, What Is the Internet?, ENTERING THE WORLD-WIDE
WEB: A GUIDE TO CYBERSPACE (May, 1994), at
http://www.maths.tcd.ie/local/JUNK/guide/guide.03.html (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); ACLU v. Reno, 1996 WL 311865, 830
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (findings of fact detailing "The Nature of Cyberspace").
"' See, e.g., Posting of Lynn Weinberger, law 1555@purpleturtle.com, to
Wi2600.org (June 12, 2000), Wi2600.org, at
http://lists.wi2600.org/pipermail/2600/2000-June/000164.html (responding to
on-line article about former prosecutor Marcia Clark's criticism of hackers,
Kevin Poulsen, Modern Psychiatry Takes Another Crack at "Diagnosing"
Hackers (June 12, 2000)) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
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that hackers, good hackers, in any event, are actively involved with
groups, primarily in the form of online hacker activities." 
2
Hackers who are interested in illicit activities, such as breaking
into computer systems and disseminating viruses and other
malicious programs, can collaborate online with others who share
similar interests. 11 3 This collaboration can encompass the
exchange of views and information, as well as the supplying of
mutual encouragement and support. It can also involve the
exchange of software and tools that can be used to break into
systems, mount denial of service attacks, and disseminate
malicious code. 14 Indeed, the availability of these tools online has
already produced a subculture of the hacker subculture.ll 5 Known
112 See, e.g., 2600, at http://www.2600.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); TizEK, at
http://www.tizek.com/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); The Hacker's Choice, at
http://www.thehackerschoice.com/forums/index.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2002)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Hacker
Network, at http://www.hackernetwork.com/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Hackers also interact
in the real world, notably at conferences like DefCon, "the largest hacker
convention on the planet." DefCon, at http://www.defcon.org/ (last visited Nov.
6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
113 See, e.g., Virus Creation Tools, at http://vx.netlux.org/vx.phpid=vct (last
visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology); Virus Constructors, at http://www.avp.ch/avpve/constr.stm (last
visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
114 See, e.g., David McCandless, Warez World, Telepolis, at
http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/te/9170/l.html (July 26, 2001) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). See also BiW
Reversing, at http://biw.rult.at/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Crackwar, at http://kickme.to/crackwar
(last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology); Lawina, at http://www.lawina.tv/forum/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2002)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
"15 See, e.g., Denis Dion, Script Kiddies and Packet Monkeys: The New
Generation of "Hackers, " SANS Institute, at
http://rr.sans.org/hackers/monkeys.php (January 29, 2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Robert Lemos, Script Kiddies:
The Net's Cybergangs, ZDNet News, at http://zdnet.com.com/2 100-11-
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pejoratively as script kiddies, the members of this sub-subculture
tend to be juveniles who use the tools they obtain online to carry
out somewhat malicious, more or less effective, but still
technically unsophisticated, hacks." 6 This hacker subculture may
well be a model for the evolution of online organized criminal
activity. It is organized; hacker sophisticates, and even script
kiddies, know where to go to find information, collaboration, and
tools. 1'7 They may very well not know the real-world identities of
those with whom they interact, but that is unimportant." 18 What is
important are signs, indicators, bona fides which establish the
other's expertise and trustworthiness."
9
So, where does all this leave us in speculating about how
criminal organization will evolve in the cyberworld? While it is
impossible to know precisely what the future of online
cybercriminal organization holds, it is possible to extrapolate
certain trends from what has already emerged in the cyberworld
502632.html?legacy=zdnn (July 11, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
116 See, e.g., supra note 115.
117 See, e.g., Brian Martin, A Note on Security Disclosures, LOGIN: THE
MAGAZINE OF USENIX AND SAGE, Dec. 2000, at 43, at
http://www.usenix.org/publications/login/2000-12/pdfs/martin.pdf (Dec. 2000)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Avina Lobo,
The Changing Profile of a Hacker, ZDNet India News (Dec. 11, 2000), at
http://www.zdnetindia.com/news/features/stories/9157.html (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
118 See, e.g., Guy L. Steele, Jr., Confessions of a Happy Hacker, Foreward to
ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE NEW HACKER'S DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1992), available at
http://www.instinct.org/texts/argon-file/jargon.html ("On the net, people are
usually known by their logins and addresses. Thus, I have many friends whom I
know only by login name; I have no idea what their real names are.") (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
119 See, e.g., Ikonoklast, Technophilia, Underground eXperts United, at
http://www.skepticfiles.org/ezine/uxu-148.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Alan C. Robles,
Keep the Infection Alive - Inside the Dark, Weird World of Virus Writers, Hot
Manila, at http://www.hotmanila.ph/specialr/hackersworld.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
See also Tim Jordan & Paul Taylor, A Sociology of Hackers 1998, Proceedings
of the Internet Society, at http://fc.vdu.lt/Conferences/INET98/2d/2dl.htm (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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and from the differences between the real world and the virtual
world.
The extrapolation draws upon work that is being done in
another context, military strategy. John Arquilla and David
Ronfeldt, both analysts with the RAND Corporation's National
Defense Research Institute, have analyzed the effects information
technology is having, and will have, on military and other types of
combat. 12 They conclude that the rise of cyberspace and other
information technologies is altering "the ways people fight" by
"improving the power and performance of small units, and by
favoring the rise of network forms of organization, doctrine, and
strategy while making life difficult for large, traditional
hierarchical forms."'121 Arquilla and Ronfeldt believe "swarming"
will emerge as the new model for military and other forms of
conflict and replace the "brute-force massing" model that has
dominated for the last several centuries. 122 They define swarming
as:
a deliberately structured, coordinated strategic way
to strike from all directions, by means of a
sustainable pulsing for force and/or fire, close-in as
well as from stand-off positions. It will work
120 See JOHN ARQUILLA & DAVID RONFELDT, IN ATHENA'S CAMP: PREPARING
FOR CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION AGE, (1997) available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR880 (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology); John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, Swarming &
the Future of Conflict (2000) [hereinafter Swarming], available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB311 .pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
121 Arquilla & Ronfeldt, Swarming, supra note 120, at 4.
Today, the key form of organization on the rise is the
network.... The new information technologies render an
ability to connect and coordinate the actions of widely
distributed 'nodes' in almost unprecedented ways. Whoever
masters this form will accrue advantages of a substantial
nature.
Id. at 5.
122 See id. at vii-viii. See also id. at 1-6.
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best... if it is designed mainly around the
deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked
maneuver units.... 123
Arquilla and Ronfeldt note that, unlike prior modes of conflict,
swarming occurs in a "nonlinear battlespace" which is
characterized not by focused confrontation between clearly
delineated, homogeneous opposing groups but by a widely
distributed field of conflict "in which friendly and enemy forces
are intermingled." 124 Because the conflict is distributed among
widely dispersed autonomous battle units, "a great deal of
command and control authority" will devolve from the current
hierarchical military structure to the swarm units. 125 Organization
becomes lateral, not hierarchical.
As the hacker subculture demonstrates, the organizational
model of swarming developed by Arquilla and Ronfeldt is likely to
be as valid for online criminal activity as it will be for real-world
conflicts. 126 This is not to say that it will be employed to the same
ends of achieving a coordinated pulsing of force against one or
more targets. In the online world of illicit criminal activities,
swarming will manifest itself as a series of shifting coalitions
among variously-populated, variously-structured entities. These
entities will be individuals or small, associative criminal groups.
Arquilla and Ronfeldt call the "maneuver units," that will carry out
military swarming, "pods.' 27 In the world of cybercrime, these
123 Id. at vii. See also id. at 8-9 (swarming emphasizes "forces or fires that can
strike at will-wherever they will").
124 Id. at 46.
125 Id. at 45.
126 This is not to characterize the hacker subculture as a "criminal" organization.
Hacker subculture has both legitimate and illegitimate aspects, though by
reputation the latter tend to overshadow the former. It is instructive to analyze
hacker subculture because its concern with illegal intrusions into computer
systems and the dissemination of malicious code mean that it displays some of
the elements of a criminal organization. For example, it employs structures and
procedures designed to frustrate law enforcement monitoring and preserve the
anonymity and freedom of those involved in the subculture. In the real world,
structures and procedures such as these are embedded in formal organizational
structures, but in the cyberworld they become part of the web of a fluid
associative network.
127 See, e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, Swarming, supra note 120, at vii.
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"maneuver units" will consist of individual actors and, probably,
small gang-like structures, groups that consist of a very few,
anywhere from two to six, individuals but have some defined
leadership structure. These "units" will operate in a networked
environment. The network will offer points of contact the "units"
can utilize to assemble collaborative action, that is, coalitions to
carry out specific criminal endeavors and, if necessary, take
retaliative action against rivals or overly-intrusive government
agencies.
The leadership structures utilized by these "unit" groups
will no doubt be more egalitarian than those found in their real-
world counterparts because it is likely that the online groups will
be composed of individuals who have roughly equivalent technical
skills. In the cyberworld, after all, one's aptitude as a
cybercriminal is a function of his or her technical expertise.
Having such expertise means that every cybercriminal has the
ability to become an independent illicit entrepreneur."' While
there may be opportunistic reasons to affiliate with a cybercriminal
group, such an affiliation is not essential for the pursuit of a
criminal career, as it is for members of real-world gangs. 129 The
128 Indeed, it is likely that membership in the hypothesized, online gang-like
structures will be transient and situational. That is, cybercriminals will affiliate
for periods of time, perhaps to concentrate on achieving certain illicit goals, and
then disaffiliate, each going his or her own way.
The individual cybercriminal's ability to operate independently is in
some ways analogous to the small-scale criminal activities Mafia soldiers
operate to generate personal revenue. A Mafia soldier may, for example, run a
small numbers operation or use a "legitimate" business to aggregate fraudulent
profits. The cybercriminal will, however, be far more autonomous, since a
Mafia soldier's ability to conduct such operations is dependent upon his good
standing within the larger criminal organization. The Mafia organization not
only sanctions his ability to engage in such activities, it provides needed support,
in the form of capital, drugs, enforcement structures, etc. Because the
cybercriminal operates in a world free of physical constraints, he or she is not
dependent upon this type of support structure and can therefore operate
independently.
129 As section II explained, the advantage real-world gangs offer is their ability
to concentrate physical force of gang members. A gang member is valuable
only insofar as he or she contributes such force. It is rare for gang members to
leave the gang and become independent contractors in violence and
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transient member's ability to quit the group at any time will
militate against a rigid, hierarchical leadership structure. While the
group will require some type of leadership, it will probably tend
toward a consensus model both because of the autonomy of the
members and because of the emphasis on collaborative action, not
on a regimented concentration of physical effort.'
30
Online criminal organization will tend to de-emphasize
formal, hierarchical organizational structures. At the same time, it
will emphasize a broader, lateral contextual structure. Online
criminal organization has no reason to be circumscribed, in its
membership or in its operations, by national, territorial boundaries
or by cultural differences because cybercriminals, like all citizens
of the cyberworld, share a culture that transcends national borders
and context. So, as opposed to the localized, rigid, and often
provincial hierarchical organizations that have so far characterized
criminal groups, regional, or even global, coalitions will develop.
These coalitions will be composed of sole cybercrime
entrepreneurs and members of diffuse, loosely-structured
opportunity groups, criminal associative entities that come together
to exploit specific types of entrepreneurial activities or for other
purposes, such as retaliating against government groups. The
coalitions will come into existence for specific purposes and
survive for as long as it takes to accomplish those purposes and
dissolve. Since the coalitions will be transitory and goal-specific,
online cybercriminals, both individuals and groups, will probably
belong to several coalitions at once.
This shift into a diffuse, fluid, and geographically and
culturally diverse organizational model will pose challenges for
law enforcement, which retains a traditional, hierarchical
organizational structure. 13 1 Law enforcement will no longer be
intimidation. For most gang members, the group offers more security and
stability.
130 See supra § 1I. See, e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, supra note 120, at 280,
available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR880/MR880.ch12.pdf (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
131 See, e.g., Richard M. Ayres, So You Want to Be a Leader?, National
Executive Institute Associates, Major Cities Chiefs Association and Major
County Sheriff's Association, at http://www.neiassociates.org/leader.htm (Apr.
1994) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). See also
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able to compile and maintain genealogical charts of crime families
and their operations, for what is a criminal group today may melt
away tomorrow, as members move on to individual efforts or other
criminal alliances. Indeed, this may well prove to be one reason
why online criminals will evolve this type of "disorganized"
criminal organization. This new model means there are no set,
fixed, easily identified and easily tracked criminal organizations.
There are "Mafias of the moment," not geographically, nor
genetically fixed Mafia entities. It also means online criminals can
collaborate as necessary but run relatively little risk that their
colleagues in crime will be able to inform on them to law
enforcement because partners in crime will no longer know who
their collaborators are or where they are located.
On the other hand, if law enforcement discards its
adherence to the hierarchical model it developed to deal with
traditional crime and adapts to this new model of criminal
organization, it might actually find its effectiveness enhanced, at
least in certain respects. For instance, it is difficult for officers to
infiltrate certain real-world criminal organizations because of the
ethnicity or other qualities one must have to join the group. These
requirements may survive, to some extent, in the online world of
criminal organization. They might, for example, serve as a
condition for joining one of the small gang-like structures
hypothesized above. Requirements such as these, however, will
not assume the importance in the online world that they do in the
real world. In the real world, these qualifying criteria serve a
distinct function. A common ethnic background or act of self-
mutilation serves as a guaranty of trustworthiness, an indicator that
the person is committed to the group and the ends it pursues.
132
Edward Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police
Department's Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, at
http://lawweb.usc.edu/faculty/chemerinsky/rampart finalrep.html (2000) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
132 See, e.g., Testimony of Joseph D. Pistone, Former Special Agent, Federal
Bureau of Investigation (1988) (testifying as a witness before the U.S. Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government
Affairs), at http://americanmafia.com/pistone testimony.html (Nov. 15, 2002)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). See generally
Finckenauer, supra note 58.
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 4
ORGANIZED CYBERCRIME?
This is important for some real-world criminal organizations,
especially Mafia-style organizations, because they emphasize
personal commitment to the group and contemplate a stable, long-
term membership.'
33
Neither personal commitment nor stable, long-term
membership will be characteristic of online criminal organization.
Online criminal organization will be a matter of the moment or of
situation-specific association. The transient nature of online
criminal organizations will mean that traditional indicia of
commitment, and of membership, will decline in importance.
Instead of multi-generational criminal enterprises, cybercriminal
organization will emphasize arm's length, instrumental associative
alliances. What will matter is whether someone is willing and
available to join forces for a particular criminal endeavor, what
their qualifications are, and whether they exhibit the level of
trustworthiness needed for a transitory collaboration. The latter
will prove less important in the online context than in the real
world because of the greater opportunities the cyberworld offers
for shielding one's identity, thereby minimizing the risk of
exposure and apprehension.
IV. Conclusion
This article is a speculation: it reflects upon the evolution
of criminal organization in the real world and hypothesizes about
how the incorporation of cyberspace into illicit activities may
result in the development of new and more fluid types of organized
crime.
Specifically, this article traces the development of real-
world organized crime from the emergence of the gang to the
relatively recent appearance of complex, hierarchical structures. It
explains that each of these real-world organizational models
evolved for a specific purpose. The gang structure evolved long
ago as a way of concentrating and directing the efforts of a number
of individuals; it is optimally suited for orchestrating simultaneous
collective activity involving the utilization of or threatened
133 See, e.g., id.
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utilization of physical force. The gang structure typically is used
in a parasitical fashion by allowing its members to profit by
preying upon others. Complex hierarchical structures, on the other
hand, are a product of the twentieth century, a response to the post-
Prohibition emergence of complex entrepreneurial criminal
activity. As with legitimate endeavors, hierarchical organization
lets lawbreakers orchestrate and synchronize the extensive,
complex division of labor that is needed to carry out large-scale,
income-generating criminal activities.
Both of these organizational types evolved in the context of
real-world endeavors, mankind having lived exclusively in the real
world until quite recently. The Internet is still in its infancy, but
we have already seen large segments of human activity migrate
wholly or partially into cyberspace, a trend that will only
accelerate. Criminal activity has also moved into cyberspace, and
this, too, is a trend that will only accelerate; lawbreakers will shift
much of their activity into cyberspace because it will increasingly
be the venue where illicit profits are to be made and because it
offers operational advantages.1
34
This article considers how crime's movement into
cyberspace will affect the structure of organized criminal activity.
It explains that because cyberspace frees individuals from many of
134 As to the former, consider the following:
"Willie Sutton said that he robbed banks because that's where
the money was," says Richard Hunter of Gartner, which
recently conducted a study of cybercrime. "Today's Internet
criminals don't have to rob banks. With currently available
technology, they can just as easily rob tens of thousands of
individuals, with less chance of being caught."
Greg Farrell, Police Have Few Weapons Against Cyber-Criminals. Problem
Stems from Lack of Funds, Training, USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 2000, 5B, available
at http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cti880.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Cyberspace, in other words, will
become the marketplace in which online offenders can prey on legitimate
citizens as well as conducting their own income-generating activities. As to the
operational advantages cyberspace offers, it gives criminals the chance to
conduct their activities with a fair degree of anonymity, to exploit gaps in the
laws of various countries and to exploit the lack of resources and other
constraints many law enforcement agencies suffer under when trying to deal
with online offenders. See id.
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the constraints that apply to activities in the real world, neither of
the extant forms of criminal organization will likely make the
transition to online crime. The gang structure evolved to
concentrate the efforts of numerous individuals in the real world, a
more or less stable, more or less permanent organization,
especially when the efforts involved the application or threat of
physical force. In the cyberworld, however, processes can be
automated, which may mean there will be little premium put on the
ability to concentrate the efforts of individuals, especially since
real-world physical force is unlikely to play a significant role in
online criminal activities. Even if occasions arise that require
concentrating the efforts of discrete individuals, this can no doubt
be accomplished situationally by recruiting individuals to
collaborate in a specific endeavor. Situational concentrations of
effort are far more easily achieved in cyberspace than in the real
world. Activity in cyberspace is not constrained by geography or
other temporal limitations. Indeed, even time is less of a constraint
in cyberspace, where processes can be automated and monitored
only sporadically. It seems, then, that the gang structure is
unlikely to make the transition to cyberspace, at least not in the
form it has assumed in the real world.
The same is likely to be true of the complex, hierarchical
structure. As the previous section explains, the hierarchical
structure evolved to allow criminal groups to carry out large-scale,
complicated entrepreneurial activities in the real world.
Miscreants will probably engage in illicit entrepreneurial activities
in cyberspace, but the organization of these activities may take
very different forms than they do in the real world. In the real
world, hierarchy is used to orchestrate the efforts of discrete
individuals into a relatively seamless process that is directed
toward achieving certain ends, for example, manufacturing,
bottling, shipping, marketing, and collecting revenues from illegal
liquor. In the real world, processes such as these tend to rely
heavily on individual effort. In cyberspace, however, many
processes can be automated, which may mean that the hierarchical
mode of organization will not make the transition into the
cyberworld. Consequently, as the previous section explains, online
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criminal activity will almost certainly emphasize lateral
relationships, networks instead of hierarchies.
This, in turn, means that we will see the evolution of new
and different modes of criminal organization in cyberspace;
indeed, criminal organization in cyberspace may well be a
situational concept. Specifically, instead of assuming stable
configurations that persist for years, online criminal organization
may incorporate the "swarming" model, in which individuals
coalesce for a limited period of time in order to conduct a
specifically defined task or set of tasks and, having succeeded, go
their separate ways. If cybercrime adopts this organizational
model, law enforcement's task will become much more difficult; in
the real-world, the stability and consistency of organized criminal
groups gives law enforcement a fixed target upon which to focus
its efforts. Police concentrate on identifying a permanent group of
participants who engage in a set of routine illicit activities. This
predictability, in itself, enhances law enforcement's ability to
combat organized crime. If online criminal organization evolves
into the "Mafia of the moment" or the "cartel of the day," police
will lose this advantage, which will only contribute to the success
of organized cybercrime.
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